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Unethical behavior in the workplace causes harm to organizations and has a widespread 
impact on society. Recent studies show that difficult and specific goals can lead to unethical 
behavior. Specifically, studies show that individuals are more likely to lie about their 
performance when they receive a difficult and specific goal compared to when they receive an 
easy or vague goal. Moreover, they are more likely to do so when they miss the goal by a 
small margin compared to when they miss the goal by a large margin. However, decades of 
research has demonstrated that assigning a difficult and specific goal to employees leads to 
higher performance than assigning an easy or vague goal. This poses a dilemma regarding the 
use of difficult and specific goals: How can organizations improve employees’ performance 
without also increasing unethical behavior? Drawing on Control theory (Carver & Scheier, 
1998) and Gestalt framework of dynamic experiences (Ariely & Carmon, 2003), we predicted 
that among individuals whose goal progress decelerates, missing the goal by a small margin 
(compared to a large margin) would have a weak effect on the extent to which they lie about 
their performance. On the other hand, we predicted that among individuals whose rate of goal 
progress is constant or accelerates over time, individuals who miss the goal by a small margin 
would be more likely to lie than individuals who miss the goal by a large margin. In two 
experimental studies, we found some support for our hypotheses. 
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Unethical behavior is a serious problem in organizations. For example, employees at 
Bausch and Lomb overstated their profits to meet their target (Norris, 1997), toy companies were 
caught using cheap but dangerous paint on children’s toys (Lipton & Barboza, 2007), and more 
recently, employees at Volkswagen developed a device to cheat on tests of car emission 
standards (Hotten, 2015). Importantly, unethical behaviors not only hurt organizations 
(Diermeier, 2011; Turban & Cable, 2003) but also innocent individuals outside of the 
organization. For example, investors who were deceived by false financial reports could lose 
their money, children who were exposed to dangerous toys could become ill, and cars that 
violated emission standards could pollute the environment. Because of such widespread negative 
impact on society, stakeholders are increasingly demanding organizations to manage their 
employees in a way that minimizes unethical behavior (Treviño, Weaver, & Reynolds, 2006). 
Thus, it is important to understand the role that management practices might have on employee 
unethical behavior. 
One management practice that has recently received attention in the behavioral ethics 
literature is goal-setting. Specifically, recent studies have demonstrated that assigning difficult 
and specific goals to employees may have an unwanted side effect of increasing unethical 
behavior (Schweitzer, Ordóñez, & Douma, 2004; Welsh & Ordóñez, 2014a; Welsh & Ordóñez, 
2014b). In these studies, individuals who were assigned a difficult and specific goal were more 
likely to engage in unethical behavior compared to individuals who were assigned an easy goal. 
As such, Ordóñez, Schweitzer, Galinksy, and Bazerman (2009) have cautioned organizations 
against setting difficult and specific goals to prevent unethical behavior. However, setting 




Decades of research has demonstrated that employees who are assigned difficult and specific 
goals perform better than employees who are assigned easy or vague goals (Latham & Locke, 
1979; Locke & Latham, 1990; Locke & Latham, 2002; Locke & Latham, 2007; Mento, Steel, & 
Karren, 1987). In short, difficult and specific goals increase employee performance but might 
also increase unethical behavior. This creates a practical dilemma: How can organizations 
encourage employees to perform well, without also encouraging them to behave unethically?  
To begin resolving this dilemma, we argue that difficult and specific goals might only 
cause unethical behavior under certain conditions. Past findings suggest that the difference 
between individuals’ performance level at the deadline and the assigned goal, or discrepancy, 
may predict lying. Specifically, Schweitzer et al. (2004) found that individuals were particularly 
more likely to lie about their performance when their discrepancy was small (i.e., missed the goal 
by a small margin), compared to when their discrepancy was large (i.e., missed the goal by a 
large margin). Critically, however, past research has ignored individuals’ experiences during 
goal pursuit. This is important because individuals’ experiences during goal pursuit might affect 
the extent to which momentary experiences (such as missing the goal by a small margin) 
influence unethical behavior. We drew on Control theory (Carver & Scheier, 1998) and Gestalt 
framework of dynamic experiences (Ariely & Carmon, 2003) to form our predictions on the role 
of individuals’ experiences during goal pursuit. We argue that trajectory, which reflects the 
changes (or lack thereof) in the individuals’ speed of progress during goal pursuit, will affect the 
impact of discrepancy on the extent to which individuals lie about their performance. This is 
because when individuals’ goal progress decelerates, they might be more likely to believe that 
they will not attain the goal, compared to when the rate of goal progress remains the same or 




compared to when it seems likely (Shalvi, Dana, Handgraaf, & De Dreu, 2011). Thus, we argue 
that decelerating trajectory can weaken the impact of discrepancy on the extent to which 
individuals lie about their performance.  
In this manuscript, we present results from two laboratory experiments in which we 
manipulated both discrepancy and trajectory, and measured individuals’ self-reported 
performance on a work simulation task. We used the participants’ self-reported performance on 
the work simulation task to infer the extent to which they lied about their performance. In Study 
1, we examined decelerating and constant trajectories, and in Study 2, we examined decelerating, 
constant, and accelerating trajectories. By experimentally manipulating discrepancy and 
trajectory and measuring participants’ behavior in the laboratory, we were able to draw causal 
conclusions about the effects of discrepancy and trajectory on unethical behavior.  
Overstating Performance 
In this manuscript, we examine one type of unethical behavior that is relevant in the 
context of goal pursuit: overstatement of performance. We define overstating performance as a 
behavior in which individuals report a level of performance that is greater than their actual level 
of performance. For example, employees whose task is to wipe the tables at a restaurant might 
report to their supervisor that they wiped all of the tables when in fact they only wiped half of 
them. Other examples of overstatement include employees stating that they inspected a gas tank 
for safety when in fact they have not done so, or employees reporting that they met their sales 
quota when they have not met the quota. Overstating one’s performance is a type of unethical 
workplace behavior (Treviño et al., 2006) because it violates the ethical standard of truthfulness 
(Russell et al., 2016). Violating the standard of truthfulness means providing others information 




overstate their performance, they are providing information about their performance outcome 
that is inaccurate.  
Importantly, overstatement is particularly relevant in the context of goal setting. If a goal 
is difficult, many employees will not attain the goal. This is because goal difficulty is often 
defined by the probability that a goal can be reached. For example, a goal that only 10% of 
employees can attain is more difficult than a goal that 90% of employees can attain (Locke, 
Chah, Harrison, & Lustgarten, 1989). This means that when a difficult goal is assigned to a 
group of employees, the majority of employees are expected to fail to attain the goal. As such, 
employees’ behavior after failing to attain a difficult goal is a relevant issue for most of the 
employees. Moreover, employees who did not attain the goal may be more likely to overstate 
their performance than those who attained the goal, because the psychological cost (and in some 
cases financial cost) of failing to attain a work goal is likely greater than that of attaining the goal 
(Schweitzer et al., 2004). Thus, in this paper, we focus on situations in which employees failed to 
meet a difficult goal and subsequently have the opportunity to overstate their performance. 
Specifically, among employees who did not attain the goal, we examine the ways in which their 
discrepancy and trajectory affect their overstatement. 
Discrepancy 
Although difficult and specific goals often increase employee performance, recent studies 
have shown that they might also cause individuals to overstate their performance (Schweitzer et 
al., 2004; Welsh & Ordóñez, 2014a; Welsh & Ordóñez, 2014b). For example,  individuals who 
were assigned a difficult and specific goal of completing 12 math questions in 4 minutes later 




vague, “do your best” goal (Welsh & Ordóñez, 2014a). Because of such findings, some scholars 
have cautioned organizations against assigning difficult and specific goals (Ordóñez et al., 2009). 
However, among individuals who were assigned a difficult goal, people may be more 
likely to overstate their performance in some situations than others. Specifically, Schweitzer et 
al. (2004) found that when individuals missed a difficult goal by a small margin, they were more 
likely to report a higher level of performance compared to when they missed the goal by a large 
margin. That is, the difference between individuals’ performance level at the deadline and the 
assigned goal, which we call discrepancy, may affect the extent to which they overstate their 
performance. The following scenario illustrates an example of discrepancy: Imagine a restaurant 
employee whose goal was to clean 50 tables by 12 p.m. However, the employee only cleaned 20 
tables by 12 p.m. This employee has a discrepancy of 30 tables (i.e., difference between 50 and 
20 tables). Importantly, among employees who failed to attain a goal, their discrepancy can vary. 
At the deadline, some employees may have a small discrepancy (e.g., five tables remaining) 
whereas other employees may have a large discrepancy (e.g., thirty tables remaining).   
Schweitzer et al. (2004) argued that a smaller discrepancy leads to greater likelihood of 
overstatement compared to a larger discrepancy. They formed this prediction by drawing on 
research on counterfactual thoughts. Counterfactual thoughts refer to imagined alternative 
versions of actual events (Roese, 1994; Roese, 1997). Counterfactual thoughts may affect 
overstatement because they help individuals to justify their lie (Shalvi et al., 2011; Bassarak et 
al., 2017). Individuals need to justify their lie because lying can incur some psychological cost, 
such as threatening their positive self-concept (Mazar, Amir, & Ariely, 2008). For example, 
studies have shown that individuals lie to profit themselves, but they do so only to the extent that 




Counterfactual thoughts facilitate justifying a lie by making the lie seem less distant from reality 
(Shalvi et al., 2011). That is, if individuals can generate counterfactuals that appear probable 
(i.e., what could have happened), they can more easily construe their lie as a plausible alternative 
outcome. 
Moreover, counterfactual thinking is more likely to occur in certain situations than in 
others. Missing a goal by a small margin is more likely to generate counterfactuals than missing 
it by a large margin (Kahneman & Varey, 1990; Roese, 1997). This is because individuals 
interpret the fact that they almost reached a goal as an indicator that goal attainment was highly 
likely (Covey & Zhang, 2014; Kahneman & Varey, 1990). For example, if individuals missed a 
flight by a few minutes, they are more likely to think that they could have caught the flight 
compared to if they missed the flight by several hours. Thus, a small discrepancy is more likely 
to generate counterfactuals about “what could have plausibly happened” compared to a large 
discrepancy.  
In sum, consistent with Schweitzer and colleagues’ (2004) findings, we expected that a 
small discrepancy will lead individuals to overstate to a greater extent compared to a large 
discrepancy.  
Hypothesis 1: Individuals will overstate their performance to a greater extent when 
discrepancy is small compared to when discrepancy is large. 
However, we argue that discrepancy does not fully capture the process through which 
goal-pursuit leads to overstatement. Because goal-pursuit typically occurs over time, it is 







In the present research, we argue that trajectory, or individuals’ pattern of goal progress 
over time, will reduce the effect of discrepancy on overstatement. By “pattern of goal progress,” 
we mean a pattern that reflects changes (or lack thereof) in the rate of goal progress. For 
example, an individual’s goal progress may be rapid at first, but slow down later. Importantly, 
trajectory can vary even when the discrepancy remains the same. That is, individuals with 
different trajectories can ultimately have the same performance level by the deadline. If their 
goal was the same, this results in identical discrepancy with differences in trajectory. We propose 
that although in general, a small discrepancy leads to greater overstatement compared to a large 
discrepancy, certain trajectories can reduce or enhance the impact of discrepancy on 
overstatement. That is, even when individuals end up at the same level of performance by the 
deadline, how they got there can be different. This might in turn affect the extent to which they 
overstate their performance. 
Trajectory can take many forms, but we propose three examples of trajectories that 
individuals may experience at work: decelerating, constant, and accelerating trajectories (Figure 
1). When individuals have a decelerating trajectory, they progress toward their goal rapidly at 
first, but their progress slows down later. For example, a restaurant employee whose goal is to 
wipe 50 tables might wipe the tables at a rate of one table every 10 seconds as soon as they begin 
working. However, this rate might gradually slow down to one table every 30 seconds. 
Alternatively, when individuals have a constant trajectory, they do not experience a change in 
their speed of progress. For example, the restaurant employee might progress toward the goal at 
a relatively constant rate of wiping one table every 20 seconds. Finally, when individuals have an 




passes. For example, the restaurant employee might begin working at a slow rate of wiping one 
table every 30 seconds, but this rate might gradually increase to one table every 10 seconds. 
Whereas we recognize that these three trajectories are not exhaustive, we argue that they 
are plausible and common in the workplace. For example, these trajectories might occur because 
employees intentionally pace their work in a certain way. Employees might pace themselves 
such that they make the most progress early and slow down their rate of progress later 
(deceleration), pace themselves such that they complete a set amount of work per unit of time 
(constant), or complete the bulk of the work close to the deadline (acceleration; Gevers, 
Mohammed, & Baytalskaya, 2015; Gevers, Rutte, & Van Eerde, 2006). Moreover, change in rate 
of progress might occur because employees become tired over time (deceleration) or employees 
become more familiar with their work task and thus work faster as time passes (acceleration; 
Healy, Kole, Buck-Gengler, & Bourne, 2004). In addition, employees might strive to maintain a 
working speed that minimizes error and discomfort (constant; Gerard, Armstrong, Martin, 
Rempel, 2002; West, 1969). In sum, there are various plausible reasons why employees might 
experience decelerating, constant, or accelerating trajectories in the workplace. Thus, in the 
current paper, we focus on these three trajectories.  
To form our predictions for the role of trajectory, we drew on Control theory research 
(Carver & Scheier, 1998) as well as research on Gestalt framework of dynamic experiences 
(Ariely & Carmon, 2003). Research on Control theory examines individuals’ sense of speed 
during goal pursuit and suggests that individuals infer their likelihood of goal attainment from 
their speed of progress. That is, when individuals are progressing slowly toward a goal, they are 
less likely to believe that they can reach their goal, compared to when individuals are progressing 




can mean that an individual’s progress was initially rapid. However, the change in speed from 
fast to slow (decelerating) generates the feeling of progressing slowly because the rapid initial 
progress is compared against the slower progress (Carver & Scheier, 1998; Chang et al., 2010). 
On the other hand, a constant trajectory does not involve any change in speed and an accelerating 
trajectory involves an increase in speed. Thus, while individuals are pursuing their goal, 
individuals with a decelerating trajectory may be less likely to expect goal attainment compared 
to individuals with a constant or an accelerating trajectory.  
We also drew from research on Gestalt framework of dynamic experiences (Ariely & 
Carmon, 2003) which examines individuals’ perception of trends in their experiences over time. 
This literature provides additional support for our claim that a decelerating trajectory leads to a 
lower expectation of goal attainment compared to a constant or an accelerating trajectory. 
Research suggests that individuals form a global impression of trends in their experiences over 
time and that they expect this trend to continue into the future (Ariely & Carmon, 2003; Reb & 
Cropanzano, 2007; Reb & Greguras, 2010). This means that a stronger positive trend (i.e., 
improvements) in individuals’ current experiences lead to a stronger expectation that their 
experiences will continue to improve in the future. For example, employees whose job 
satisfaction has been improving are more likely to expect that their work outcomes in the future 
will continue to improve compared to employees whose job satisfaction has not been improving 
(Chen, Ployhart, Thomas, Anderson, & Bliese, 2011). Applied in the context of goal pursuit, we 
argue that individuals will project their current trend in goal progress and expect that the trend 
will continue. Close to the deadline, a decelerating trajectory has a flatter trend in goal progress 
compared to a constant or an accelerating trajectory. This means that, as the deadline approaches, 




not improve compared to individuals with a constant or an accelerating trajectory. Thus, while 
individuals pursue their goal, individuals with a decelerating trajectory will have a lower 
expectation of goal attainment compared to individuals with a constant or an accelerating 
trajectory. 
Interaction between Trajectory and Discrepancy 
The abovementioned literatures suggest that trajectory influences the extent to which 
individuals expect that they will attain the goal. We combine this idea with the rationale for the 
effect of discrepancy on overstatement. We propose that trajectory influences the relationship 
between discrepancy and overstatement because trajectory affects individuals’ expectation of 
goal attainment. Recall that a small discrepancy is expected to lead to greater overstatement than 
a large discrepancy because when the discrepancy is small, the alternative outcome to missing 
the goal (i.e., goal attainment) appears more likely than when the discrepancy is large. We 
argued that believing that goal attainment was likely generates counterfactual thoughts, which 
help individuals to justify overstating their performance. If trajectory affects individuals’ belief 
about goal attainment, trajectory may influence the impact of discrepancy on overstatement.  
Decelerating Trajectory 
As we argued above, during goal pursuit, if individuals’ trajectory is decelerating, their 
expectation to attain the goal is lower, compared to if the trajectory is constant or accelerating. 
Thus, even after they attain a performance level that is close to the goal (i.e., small discrepancy), 
individuals with a decelerating trajectory and a small discrepancy may not be any more likely to 
believe that goal attainment was highly likely, compared to individuals with a decelerating 
trajectory and a large discrepancy. If their discrepancy is large, both their trajectory and 




decelerating trajectory, discrepancy is expected to have a weak effect on overstatement. In sum, 
we predicted that a decelerating trajectory will reduce the impact of discrepancy on 
overstatement. 
Constant or Accelerating Trajectory 
In contrast to a decelerating trajectory, when individuals’ trajectory is constant or 
accelerating, the effect of discrepancy on overstatement will be pronounced. Prior to the 
deadline, individuals are likely to infer from a constant or an accelerating trajectory that they are 
likely to attain the goal. However, the extent to which individuals hold this expectation will 
depend on discrepancy. 
Small discrepancy. We argue that, among individuals with a constant or an accelerating 
trajectory, those with a small discrepancy will have a higher expectation of goal attainment than 
those with a large discrepancy. This is because prior to the deadline, individuals who will 
eventually have a small discrepancy are in fact on a track toward coming close to attaining the 
goal. Thus, when they use their trajectory to estimate their future progress, they are more likely 
to believe that they will attain the goal compared to individuals whose discrepancy is large.  
Large discrepancy. On the other hand, prior to the deadline, individuals who will 
eventually have a large discrepancy are in fact on a track toward missing the goal by a large 
margin. Thus, if they project their trajectory and estimate their future progress, they are likely to 
anticipate their eventual failure, even if their current trajectory forms a positive trend (constant or 
accelerating trajectory). Because these individuals form a lower expectation prior to the deadline 
compared to individuals whose discrepancy is small, they will be less inclined to generate 




As such, among individuals with a constant or an accelerating trajectory, those with a 
small discrepancy are more likely to generate counterfactuals and overstate their performance 
compared to those with a large discrepancy. In turn, among individuals with a constant or an 
accelerating trajectory, those with a small discrepancy are more likely to overstate their 
performance than those with a large discrepancy. As such, the effect of discrepancy on 
overstatement will be more pronounced when individuals have a constant or an accelerating 
trajectory compared to a decelerating trajectory. Thus, we predicted that individuals whose 
discrepancy is small and whose trajectory is constant or accelerating would overstate their 
performance to the greatest extent. 
Hypothesis 2: The effect of discrepancy on overstatement will be attenuated when 
individuals’ trajectory is decelerating compared to when their trajectory is constant or 
accelerating. As such, individuals will overstate to the greatest extent when their 








Participants. Participants were 121 undergraduate students at a large Canadian 
university. The sample was 59.84% female, with a mean age of 20.84 (SD = 2.35). Participants 
were mostly Asian (42.62%) or White (36.07%). Among the 121 participants, 96 received course 
credit and 25 received $5 for participating. Receiving course credit or cash did not affect 
overstatement and did not moderate any of our effects of interest. 
Procedure. We advertised the study as a “Managerial skills study” on an online platform 
for university students seeking to complete research studies. The study took place in a computer 
lab. Each study session consisted of up to five individuals participating at the same time and 
lasted for about 30 minutes. Each participant sat at a computer station and completed the study 
individually. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four between-subject conditions 
within a 2 x 2 design manipulating discrepancy (small vs. large) and trajectory (constant vs. 
decelerating). Participants completed a demographic questionnaire followed by the experimental 
task described below. 
Experimental task. The experimental task was modeled after Wood and Bandura’s 
(1989) managerial decision-making simulation task. Participants received all instructions on the 
computer. Participants were told to complete a “computer simulation exercise” which measures 
their “intuitive managerial skill.” To incentivize doing well on this task, we told the participants 
that performance on this task predicts performance in real work settings. Participants played the 
role of a manager at a stuffed toy factory. The participants’ task was to assign four different jobs 
to four employees so that each employee is responsible for one job. Each job corresponded to a 




description of each job and summary information about each employee. The brief summary 
contained information about each employee’s level of skill in machine operation, their ability to 
attend to details, their working speed, and their energy level. We selected these employee 
attributes because we believed that, to a naïve participant, these attributes will appear to be 
important to the jobs at the factory. 
Participants then learned that the computer would run a simulation of the factory based 
on how the jobs were assigned. They were told that the output of the simulation shows the 
number of boxes of toys produced at the factory over a 120-minute shift. We modeled a working 
condition in which individuals are given a difficult and specific goal by giving the participants a 
goal. Participants read the following before they began assigning the jobs to the employees: “As 
a manager, it is important that you commit to a specific yet attainable target. Your target is to 
produce 100 boxes of toys by the deadline (120 minutes). This target is difficult, but realistic.” 
Figure 2 shows a screenshot of the job assignment page. Participants had 75 seconds to assign 
the four jobs to the four employees. During the last 20 seconds, they saw a warning message that 
stated that they must finish assigning the jobs before the page advances automatically. After 
assigning the jobs, participants saw the output of the simulation, which we describe next. 
Manipulation. Although participants were told that the way in which they assigned the 
jobs determines the output of the simulation and thus their own performance on this simulation 
task, in reality, the participants’ decisions had no impact on the output. Instead, the output of the 
simulation was used to manipulate trajectory and discrepancy. Participants were told to press the 
“Start” button to begin watching the simulation (Figure 3). Participants saw an output graph that 




representing the production of toys during the 120-minute shift. Participants saw an animated 
graph corresponding to their assigned condition (top four graphs of Figure 4). 
Trajectory was manipulated by showing the participants a graph that grew linearly (for 
the constant conditions) or one that grew rapidly initially but tapered later (for the decelerating 
conditions). Discrepancy was manipulated by the number of boxes produced by the deadline, 
displayed on the final frame of the animated graph. In the small discrepancy condition, the graph 
ended at 95.5 boxes and in the large discrepancy condition, the graph ended at 75 boxes. Figure 5 
shows a sample screen shot of the final frame. The number corresponding to the number of 
boxes produced (95.5 and 75) was not displayed on the screen for participants to see, but  rather 
was plotted on the graph. Participants had to examine the graph’s y-axis to find and report the 
number of boxes produced by the deadline. We did not display the number of boxes produced 
(95.5 and 75) on the screen because we were interested in participants’ self-report of their 
performance. 
 Dependent variable. Self-reported number of boxes produced was measured to infer 
overstatement. After viewing the simulation graph, participants were asked to report the number 
of boxes they produced by the deadline. Participants selected a number on a 0-120 slider bar on 
an electronic survey that appeared immediately after the final frame of the simulation. 
Participants were not able to refer back to the graph at this point in the experiment. Overstating 
was operationalized as reporting a number that is larger than the actual number of boxes 
produced (i.e., 95.5 and 75 for small and large discrepancy, respectively). We computed an 
overstatement score for each participant by subtracting their self-reported number of boxes from 
the actual number of boxes. Thus, a higher score on this variable indicated overstating to a 





 We predicted that individuals with a small discrepancy would overstate to a greater 
extent than individuals with a large discrepancy (Hypothesis 1). We also predicted that the effect 
of discrepancy on overstatement will be attenuated when individuals’ trajectory is decelerating 
compared to when their trajectory is constant. Hypothesis 1 was tested by examining the main 
effect of discrepancy on overstatement in a two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA). Hypothesis 
2 predicted an ordinal interaction in which a particular group (i.e., small discrepancy and 
constant trajectory) was expected to be significantly different from the other groups. Ordinal 
interactions are often obscured when it is assessed through an ANOVA (Bobko, 1986; Elias, 
2004; Strube & Bobko, 1989). That is, an ANOVA may not identify a significant interaction 
when in fact an ordinal interaction is present in the population (Strube & Bobko, 1989). To 
detect an ordinal interaction, Bobko (1986) recommends the following procedure: (1) conduct a 
one-way ANOVA comparing the groups that are not expected to differ from one another, and (2) 
conduct a linear contrast to test whether the group that is hypothesized to be different is in fact 
statistically different from all the other groups. We followed Bobko’s (1986) recommendation to 
test Hypothesis 2. 
Results 
Hypothesis 1. Figure 6 shows each group’s overstatement score (i.e., mean difference 
between self-reported value and actual value). To test the prediction that a small discrepancy 
leads to overstatement to a greater extent than a large discrepancy (Hypothesis 1), we conducted 
a two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) with discrepancy and trajectory predicting 
overstatement. The results did not reveal a significant main effect of discrepancy (F(1, 117) =3.15, 




revealed a main effect of trajectory (F(1, 117) = 4.25, MSerror = 55.02,  p=.04, partial = .04), 
suggesting that trajectory manipulation affected participants’ overstatement across the 
discrepancy manipulation. Participants in the constant trajectory condition (M = 3.28) overstated 
to a greater extent than participants in the decelerating trajectory condition (M = 0.50). However, 
the analysis did not reveal an interaction between discrepancy and trajectory (F(1, 117) = .00, 
MSerror = 55.02,  p=.96, partial < .001). As noted earlier, Hypothesis 2 predicted an ordinal 
interaction, which could have been obscured in this analysis. 
Hypothesis 2. Hypothesis 2 predicted that the effect of discrepancy on overstatement will 
be attenuated when individuals’ trajectory is decelerating compared to when their trajectory is 
constant, and that individuals with a small discrepancy and a constant trajectory would overstate 
to the greatest extent. To test Hypothesis 2, we first conducted a one-way ANOVA with the three 
groups that were not expected to differ from one another. That is, we tested whether the small 
discrepancy/decelerating trajectory, the large discrepancy/decelerating trajectory, and the large 
discrepancy/constant trajectory groups did not differ from one another. As expected, a one-way 
ANOVA did not reveal a significant difference among the three groups (F(2, 91) = 1.50, MSerror = 
48.68,  p = .23, partial = .03).   
Next, we conducted a linear contrast to compare the small discrepancy/constant trajectory 
group against the three other groups. The result of this contrast indicated that individuals with a 
small discrepancy and a constant trajectory overstated the most (t(117) = 2.18, MSerror = 55.02, p 
=.03, d = .40). In sum, this set of analyses provide support for Hypothesis 2. Individuals with a 
small discrepancy and a constant trajectory overstated to the greatest extent compared to 




Supplementary analyses. To assess Hypothesis 2 further, we examined whether the 
average overstatement within each group was significantly different from zero. We conducted 
this analysis to test whether individuals in fact overstated their performance to an extent that is 
greater than chance. That is, demonstrating that overstatement in one group is larger than 
overstatement in other groups does not necessarily mean that one group’s average self-reported 
value was significantly greater than the actual value (i.e., 95.5 or 75 for small and large 
discrepancy respectively). We conducted one-sample t-tests, which allowed us to examine 
whether participants reported a performance level that is greater than they would have had they 
not overstated their performance. If they did not overstate their performance, the mean difference 
between the actual value and the self-reported value would not be significantly different from 
zero. In these analyses, we used the MSerror from the omnibus ANOVA as our estimate of 
population variance (Howell, 2014). 
We conducted four one-sample t-tests to compare the overstatement score in each of the 
four groups against zero. To caution against Type I error, the results were interpreted with a 
Bonferroni adjusted alpha level (.05/4 = .0125) per test. Results are shown in Table 1. Consistent 
with Hypothesis 2, average overstatement among individuals in the small discrepancy/constant 
trajectory condition was significantly different from zero. On the other hand, average 
overstatement scores among individuals in the decelerating trajectory conditions and the large 
discrepancy conditions were not significantly different from zero. These results provide 
additional support for Hypothesis 2, suggesting that individuals overstated their performance 





In Study 1, we did not replicate Schweitzer et al.’s (2004) finding that individuals who 
missed the goal by a small margin overstated to a greater extent than individuals who missed the 
goal by a large margin. However, we found that individuals whose discrepancy was small and 
whose trajectory was constant overstated their performance to the greatest extent. Thus, 
individuals’ experience during goal pursuit appears to be an important determinant of their 
decision to engage in unethical behavior. 
In Study 2, we sought to expand and replicate Study 1 by also examining an accelerating 
trajectory. Whereas we predicted that a decelerating trajectory would dampen individuals’ 
expectations, an accelerating trajectory might accentuate individuals’ expectations. Indeed, 
Covey and Zhang (2014) found that the sense of accelerating progression toward a goal 
increased individuals’ expectations of goal attainment and counterfactual thinking. In line with 
our argument for the role of counterfactuals, increased counterfactual thinking may in turn lead 
to increase in overstatement. Thus, it is possible that an accelerating trajectory enhances the 
effect of discrepancy on overstatement. However, among individuals with a small discrepancy, 
we did not have a strong theoretical rationale for predicting that individuals with an accelerating 
trajectory will overstate to a greater extent compared to individuals with a constant trajectory 
will. To explore whether, among individuals with a small discrepancy, an accelerating trajectory 
would lead to greater levels of overstatement compared to a constant trajectory, in Study 2, we 
added another set of conditions that reflect an accelerating trajectory. 
Study 1 was also limited in scope because of the incentive involved in overstating 
performance. In Study 1, we told the participants that the outcome of the simulation exercise 




themselves and/or to others. That is, we incentivized participants to overstate their performance 
by appealing to their need for competence. Although this is a possible motivator of unethical 
behaviors in the workplace, monetary incentive is highly appropriate and common in the context 
of goal setting. Organizations commonly link employees’ achievement of work goals with 
monetary incentives (Latham & Locke, 2006; Locke, 1975). To reflect the ways in which goal 
setting is implemented in organizations, in Study 2, we offered participants a chance to win a 







Participants. Participants were 281 undergraduate students at a large Canadian 
university. The sample was 74.64% female and had a mean age of 19.74 (SD = 3.37). Most 
participants identified themselves as White (38.49%) or Asian (38.13%). All the participants in 
this study received course credit for participating. In addition, participants had the opportunity to 
win 50 Canadian dollars. We will describe the details of the monetary incentive below. 
Procedure. As with Study 1, the study was advertised as a “Managerial skills study.” 
The study was described as one in which participants will perform a work simulation exercise 
and will have a chance to win $50 depending on their performance on the exercise. The study 
took place in the same computer lab as Study 1 and each study session lasted about 45 minutes. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of six between-subject conditions within a 2 x 3 
design manipulating discrepancy (small, large) and trajectory (decelerating, constant, 
accelerating). Participants completed demographic questionnaires and the experimental task. 
Monetary incentive. The experimental task was identical to that of Study 1, except that it 
included a description about the monetary incentive. Specifically, just before assigning the four 
jobs to the four employees, participants saw the following message: “If you produce 100 boxes 
or more by the deadline, you will get a chance to enter a draw to win $50. If you produce 100 
boxes or more, you will draw a coin at the end of the study. If you pick the winning coin, you 
will receive $50 in cash.” Because the participant’s performance on the simulation was in fact 
manipulated by the researchers, at the end of the study, all participants drew a coin for an 




Manipulation. We manipulated trajectory and discrepancy using the same method as 
Study 1. Trajectory was manipulated by showing the participants a graph that grew linearly 
(constant conditions), a graph that grew rapidly initially but slowed down later (decelerating 
conditions), or a graph that grew slowly initially but sped up later (accelerating conditions). 
Discrepancy was manipulated by the number of boxes produced by the deadline (95.5 boxes for 
small discrepancy and 75 boxes for large discrepancy). The manipulation graphs for all the 
conditions are shown in Figure 4. 
Dependent variable. As with Study 1, self-reported number of boxes that were produced 
was measured to infer overstatement. 
Results 
Hypothesis 1. Each group’s mean overstatement score is presented in Figure 7. 
Hypothesis 1 predicted that individuals with a small discrepancy would overstate to a greater 
extent than individuals with a large discrepancy. To test Hypothesis 1, we conducted a two-way 
ANOVA with discrepancy and trajectory predicting overstatement. The results did not reveal a 
main effect of discrepancy (F(1, 275) = .01, MSerror = 62.90,  p=.93, partial < .001). Thus, 
Hypothesis 1 was not supported. Moreover, the results did not reveal a main effect of trajectory 
(F(2, 275) = .82, MSerror = 62.90,  p=.44, partial = .006). The analysis also did not reveal an 
interaction between discrepancy and trajectory (F(2, 275) = 1.76, MSerror = 62.90,  p=.17, partial 
=.01). However, as with Study 1, Hypotheses 2 and 3 predicted ordinal interactions, which could 
have been obscured in this analysis. 
Hypothesis 2. Hypothesis 2 predicted that individuals in the small 
discrepancy/accelerating trajectory and individuals in the small discrepancy/constant trajectory 




the four groups that were not expected to differ from one another (i.e., the two decelerating 
conditions and the two large discrepancy conditions). As expected, a one-way ANOVA did not 
reveal a significant difference among the four groups (F(3, 185) = .33, MSerror = 72.64,  p = .81, 
partial = .005).   
Next, we conducted a linear contrast to compare the average of small 
discrepancy/constant trajectory group and small discrepancy/accelerating trajectory group 
against the average of the four other groups. The result of this contrast did not reveal a 
significant difference between these two sets of experimental groups (t(275) = .14, MSerror = 62.90, 
p =.88, d = .02). It is evident from examining the mean overstatement scores (Figure 7) that the 
results did not replicate Study 1 for the small discrepancy/constant trajectory group. In Study 1, 
this group overstated to the greatest extent, but in Study 2, the mean overstatement score was the 
lowest (M = .18) in this group compared to all other groups. 
However, the mean overstatement scores (Figure 7) suggest that the small 
discrepancy/accelerating trajectory group overstated to the largest extent. Thus, we also tested 
whether the small discrepancy/accelerating trajectory group was significantly different from the 
average of the other five groups. This contrast, however, did not reveal that the small 
discrepancy/accelerating trajectory group was significantly different from the rest (t(275) = 1.57, 
MSerror = 62.90, p =.12, d = .02). In sum, this set of analyses did not provide support for 
Hypothesis 2. 
Supplemental analyses. Although the above results suggested that the small 
discrepancy/accelerating trajectory group was not different from the other five groups, we 
explored whether the average overstatement in this group was significantly greater than zero. We 




against zero. To caution against Type I error, the results were interpreted with a Bonferroni 
adjusted alpha level (.05/6 = .008) per test. Results are shown in Table 2. Partially consistent 
with Hypothesis 2, this analysis demonstrated that the average overstatement among individuals 
in the small discrepancy/accelerating trajectory was significantly different from zero. On the 
other hand, the mean overstatement scores for individuals in all other conditions were not 
significantly different from zero.  
Summary of results. Overall, the results from Study 2 provided mixed support for our 
hypotheses. First, we did not find support for Hypothesis 1, which predicted that individuals with 
a small discrepancy would overstate to a greater extent than individuals with a large discrepancy. 
Second, we did not replicate Study 1 for the effect of constant trajectory on discrepancy; unlike 
Study 1, the results did not show that individuals in the small discrepancy/constant trajectory 
group overstated to the greatest extent. Finally, Hypothesis 2 was partially supported for the 
effect of accelerating trajectory on discrepancy. The average overstatement among individuals in 
the small discrepancy/accelerating trajectory group was significantly different from zero, 
whereas overstatement among individuals in other groups were not different from zero. That is, 







 Recent studies on goal-setting and unethical behavior have raised concerns regarding the 
possible side effects of assigning difficult and specific goals in organizations. However, even 
though employees usually pursue their work goals over time, this literature has ignored the role 
of individuals’ experiences during goal pursuit. Across two studies we found some evidence that 
individuals’ trajectory affects the relationship between their discrepancy and the extent to which 
they overstate their performance level. Specifically, we found in one study that individuals 
whose discrepancy was small and whose trajectory was constant overstated their performance to 
the greatest extent. Moreover, we found some evidence that individuals whose discrepancy was 
small and whose trajectory was accelerating were most likely to overstate their performance. 
Strengths, Limitations, and Future Directions 
A key strength of our studies is that trajectory and discrepancy were experimentally 
manipulated, which allowed us to make causal inference about the effects of trajectory and 
discrepancy on unethical behavior. Moreover, we examined individuals’ self-reported 
performance in a laboratory setting in which much of the contextual factors which could affect 
their behavior were held constant across all experimental conditions. With little confounding 
factors, we can be confident in our interpretation of the results from these studies. 
However, across two studies, we found mixed support for our hypotheses. Firstly, we did 
not replicate Schweitzer et al.’s (2004) finding that a small discrepancy leads to greater 
overstatement than a large discrepancy. It is possible that this divergence in results occurred 
because participants in Schweitzer and colleagues’ (2004) study did not see their progress over 




salient. In contrast, in our paradigm, participants saw a record of their progress over time, which 
may have dampened the impact of “being in the moment” of failing to attain the goal. 
Secondly, we did not consistently find support for the effect of constant trajectory on the 
relationship between discrepancy and overstatement. In Study 1, individuals with a constant 
trajectory and a small discrepancy were most likely to overstate, whereas in Study 2, individuals 
with a constant trajectory and a small discrepancy were least likely to overstate. This 
inconsistent finding is difficult to explain from a methodological viewpoint, since the sample 
characteristics, study stimuli, and instructions did not change between these two studies, except 
for the incentive structure. These findings might be demonstrating that the influence of trajectory 
is highly variable. As such, it is important for future studies to identify the conditions under 
which the effects of trajectory may be reversed. 
Whereas the above discussion focused on possible reasons for the mixed findings, our 
studies also have several methodological limitations that must be discussed independent of the 
findings. Firstly, we cannot rule out the possibility that the effects observed were partly due to 
participants making errors when reading the graphs, instead of purposely inflating their 
performance. For example, it is possible that certain conditions during goal pursuit nudge 
individuals to view their performance in a self-serving way, without consciously changing their 
self-report of their performance. Although we define overstatement as an unethical behavior in 
which individuals report a level of performance that they know to be wrong or inaccurate, we 
acknowledge the difficulty of confirming whether participants in our study knew their true level 
of performance. Future studies might better address this issue by testing the study materials on an 
independent sample to demonstrate that, without context or incentives to lie, individuals can 




 Secondly, the trajectories we chose to examine may have been too simplistic. For 
example, trajectory over time may involve interruptions (no progress) and setbacks (negative 
progress), which we did not model in our manipulation stimuli. However, our studies provide 
initial evidence that a simple manipulation of trajectory produce differences in overstatement. 
The set of trajectories we examined in this paper provide a starting point that future studies can 
build upon. For example, Reb and colleagues (Barnes, Reb, & Ang, 2012; Reb & Cropanzano, 
2007; Reb & Gerguras, 2010) have already explored the effects of various trajectories (e.g., 
curvilinear trajectory, declining trajectory, improving trajectory) on performance evaluation. 
Thus, there is some evidence that individuals distinguish among these trajectories and as such 
these various trajectories can be applied to studies that examine unethical behaviors. 
Theoretical Implications 
Although several studies have demonstrated that difficult and specific goals lead to an 
increase in unethical behavior, research on this topic is still at its early stage. Thus, a coherent 
theory on the side-effects of difficult and specific goals has not been developed at this point. For 
example, the specific conditions under which difficult and specific goals lead to unethical 
behavior are still unknown. To build toward a comprehensive understanding of the influence of 
goal-setting on unethical behavior, we integrated findings and theories on the ways in which 
individuals experience events over time with research on goal-setting and behavioral ethics. 
Specifically, research on diverse topics in psychology, such as sense of speed (Carver & Scheier, 
1998), performance evaluation (Reb & Cropanzano, 2007), job satisfaction (Chen et al., 2011), 
and pain (Redelmeier & Kahneman, 1996), suggest that individuals’ trajectory over time may be 
important. However, to our knowledge, research on goal-setting and unethical behavior has thus 




introducing the concept of trajectory and by demonstrating its importance to unethical behavior 
in the workplace. 
In addition to highlighting the importance of trajectory, our research opens up the 
possibility of other characteristics of individuals’ experiences over time. For example, studies 
have shown that individuals’ retrospective evaluation of a series of events is influenced by the 
most extreme moment during that episode (e.g., Ariely, 1998; Redelmeier & Kahneman, 1996). 
Thus, it is possible that in addition to trajectory, a memorable moment that occurred during goal-
pursuit affects individuals’ decision to engage in unethical behavior. For example, feeling stuck 
at one point during a goal-pursuit episode might be a frustrating and memorable moment that 
later influences individuals’ ethical decisions. In short, a broader theoretical implication of our 
research is that the ways in which individuals’ experiences over time affect their unethical 
behavior may be a fruitful area of research. 
Practical Implications 
 Our results also point to several practical implications. First, we held goal difficulty and 
specificity constant and examined individuals’ unethical behaviors when they failed to attain the 
goal. We found that unethical behavior occurred only under specific conditions (i.e., small 
discrepancy and constant or accelerating trajectory). Thus, our findings suggest that, in most 
situations, organizations can assign difficult and specific goals to their employees without the 
negative side effects of unethical behavior. Secondly, if our rationale regarding the effects of 
trajectory is correct, managers can target their intervention to prevent unethical behavior. For 
example, managers can monitor their employees’ rate of progress and remind employees that 
there will be no negative consequences for failing to attain the goal (Latham & Locke, 2006), 





 In conclusion, this paper highlights the importance of individuals’ experiences during 
goal-pursuit, which has been ignored in previous research on goal-setting and unethical behavior. 
Specifically, we found that individuals’ trajectory during goal pursuit affects the extent to which 
the discrepancy from their goal influences overstatement of their performance. Among 
individuals whose rate of goal progress was constant or accelerated over time, individuals who 
missed the goal by a small margin were more likely to lie about their performance than 
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Appendix A: Tables and Figures 
 




One-Sample t-tests Comparing Mean Difference Against Zero (Study 1)
n Mean t d
Small discrepancy / Decelerating trajectory 30 1.73 1.28 .23
Small discrepancy / Constant trajectory 30 4.44 3.28 ** .60
Large discrepancy / Decelerating trajectory 31 -.73 -.55 -.10
Large discrepancy / Constant trajectory 30 2.11 1.56 .28
Note . Mean  = mean difference between self-reported number of boxes produced and 





Table 2. Results from one-sample t-tests (Study 2)  
Table 2
One-Sample t-tests Comparing Mean Difference Against Zero (Study 2)
n Mean t d
Small discrepancy / Decelerating trajectory 47 1.64 1.41 .21
Small discrepancy / Constant trajectory 50 .18 .16 .02
Small discrepancy / Accelerating trajectory 42 3.46 2.83 ** .44
Large discrepancy / Decelerating trajectory 47 .80 .69 .10
Large discrepancy / Constant trajectory 46 2.55 2.18 .32
Large discrepancy / Accelerating trajectory 49 1.70 1.50 .21
Note . Mean  = mean difference between self-reported number of boxes produced and 





Figure 1. Decelerating, constant, and accelerating trajectory with the same discrepancy. The 
dotted line represents the goal level (e.g., number of tables that must be wiped) and the vertical 
line represents a deadline (e.g., complete the task by 12 p.m.). 
 






Figure 2. A screenshot of the job assignment page. 







Figure 3. Screenshot of the first screen of the simulation output. 







Figure 4. Manipulation graphs used for each condition. Study 1 used the constant and 
decelerating trajectory conditions. Study 2 included the accelerating trajectory conditions. 





Figure 5. Sample final frame of the simulation for manipulating trajectory and discrepancy. 








Figure 6. Mean difference between self-reported number of boxes produced and the true value 
by group (Study 1). 







Figure 7. Mean difference between self-reported number of boxes produced and the true value 
by group (Study 2). 
Figure 7. Mean overstatement by group (Study 2) 
 
